Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses by Dzionek-Kozłowska
  
Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses 
Author: Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska 
Source: ‘Annales. Ethics in Economic Life’ 2014, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 79-92 
Published by Lodz University Press 
Stable URL: http://www.annalesonline.uni.lodz.pl/archiwum/2014/2014_4_dzionekkozlowska_79_92.pdf 
 
Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses  
Autor: Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska 
Artykuł opublikowany w „Annales. Etyka w życiu gospodarczym” 2014, vol. 17, nr 4, s. 79-92 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 
Stable URL: http://www.annalesonline.uni.lodz.pl/archiwum/2014/2014_4_dzionekkozlowska_79_92.pdf 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2014 
 
Used under authorization. All rights reserved. 
Annales. Etyka w życiu gospodarczym / Annales. Ethics in Economic Life  2014 
Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2014, 79-92 
Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska 
University of Lodz, Institute of Economics 
Department of the History of Economic Thought and Economic History 
email: jdzionek@uni.lodz.pl 
Political Corruption and Electoral Systems 
Seen with Economists’ Lenses1 
Abstract 
The ongoing process of democratisation lead to the growing importance of the 
electoral systems that regulate the procedures of gaining and legitimizing power in 
democracy. Taking it into account it is worth asking about the relationship be-
tween these particular ‘game rules’ contained into electoral law and the respect of 
the rule of law, being one of the basic norms of a democratic system. A question 
then may be raised about the existence and the character of the relation between 
electoral systems and the level of political corruption. It is worth noticing that 
besides the research conducted by political scientists and the representatives of 
various branches of social sciences the significant analysis of the issue have been 
presented by the economists. 
In this article a brief overview of the economic studies on the relationship be-
tween level of political corruption and the electoral systems is presented so as to 
assess to what degree this approach may be treated as fruitful. 
Keywords: corruption, electoral system, economics imperialism  
JEL Classification: D72, D73 
                                                          
1 The article builds on the ideas presented in the paper Systemy wyborcze a korupcja. Ujęcie ekono-
miczne published in the monograph Polityczna kreacja ładu ekonomicznego. Teoria i praktyka, edited 
by M. Kalinowski, A. Pieczewski (Lodz University Press, Lodz 2013, pp. 87-99). 
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1. Introduction 
A natural consequence of the ongoing process of democratisation over the last two 
centuries has been the increase of importance of the rules that influence the way 
we choose representatives rendering power in the name of the sovereign that is the 
nation. The fundamental role is played here by electoral systems, which in modern 
democratic states based on the rule of representative democracy determine the 
way of gaining and legitimizing power. Taking into consideration their great 
weight the question arises whether these particular ‘game rules’ themselves have 
an influence on the respect of the rule of law, being one of the basic norms of 
a democratic system2. In other words – do the rules of the electoral law influence 
the scale of power abuses, which are committed by politicians holding public 
offices who are chosen according to these rules, and to what extent? A question 
then may be posed about the existence and the character of the relation between 
electoral systems and the level of political corruption, indicated in the title of this 
article.  
The notion of corruption is here confined to the abuse of power by people 
holding public offices in order to gain undue advantages3. It needs to be noted, 
however, that this phenomenon may be and frequently is defined more broadly – 
the notion of corruption may also apply to instances of abuse of the professional or 
social function fulfilled by representatives of other professions, e.g. doctors, uni-
versity teachers, policemen or office workers, as well as – which by economists is 
taken into account extremely rarely – entities working in the private sector4.  
The evidence of the difficulty in defining the term on the legal and legislative 
level may be the verdict of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from June 23rd, 2009 
overruling part of the regulations of the Central Anticorruption Bureau Bill from 
June 9th, 2006. By act of this law the provisions determining in which situations 
we deal with the phenomenon of corruption included, inter alia, in this very act 
were declared not consistent with either the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
                                                          
2 According to William Riker the capacity of the system to counteract abuse of power by politicians is 
the basis for the so-called ‘liberal’ view of democracy and is one of the basic conditions of the effec-
tiveness of the democratic system. W. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, W.H. Freeman, San Fran-
cisco 1982. 
3 Some problems with the precise interpretation of the notion of ‘political corruption’ were aptly pre-
sented by M. Philp. M. Philp, Defining Political Corruption, “Political Studies” 1997, vol. 45, pp. 436-
462. 
4 T.S. Adit, Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey, “Economic Journal” 2003, vol. 113 (Novem-
ber), pp. F632-F652; A.K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, “Journal of Economic Surveys” 2001, vol. 15, 
No. 1, pp. 73-77; A. Lewicka-Strzałecka, Indywidualny i społeczny wymiar korupcji, “Annales. Etyka 
w życiu gospodarczym” 2001, vol. 4, pp. 137-146; A. Lewicka-Strzałecka, Korupcja i zaufanie, 
‟Annales. Etyka w życiu gospodarczym” 2007, vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 212-213, http://www.annalesonline. 
uni.lodz.pl/archiwum/ 2007/2007_01_lewicka_strzalecka_211_219.pdf. 2007 (accessed 15th Septem-
ber, 2014); B. Klimczak, Korupcja w gospodarce – zło absolutne czy zło konieczne?, “Annales. Etyka 
w życiu gospodarczym” 2001, vol. 4, pp. 127-136; G.M. Hodgson, S. Jiang, The Economics of Corrup-
tion and the Corruption of Economics: An Institutionalist Perspective, “Journal of Economic Issues” 
2007, vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 1043-1061; J. Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, “Journal of 
Economic Perspectives” 2005, vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 20-21. 
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land, nor the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Article 1 point 3 of the initial text of the bill). After the verdict taking 
effect the statutory definition of corruption expanded greatly. 
The relation between corruption and the shape of electoral systems in a natu-
ral way fits the field of research into political sciences. In this context prima facie 
it may seem surprising that in the last two decades research on the subject has 
been conducted and to a great extent has been inspired by economists themselves. 
It seems that the interest in the issue on the part of the representatives of economic 
sciences has been in a way a ‘by-product’ of their great involvement in defining 
and specifying economic consequences of corruption. On the other hand, however, 
the fact may also be interpreted as one of a great many manifestations of the impe-
rialism of economics5.  
This article aims to present the economic approach to the comprehension of 
the relations between the rules that electoral systems are based on, and the level of 
corruption as well as the evaluation as to what degree this approach may be treated 
as fruitful.  
2. Electoral systems: some basics 
In the starting point it seems only natural to define what we understand under the 
term ‘electoral system’. For the needs of further analysis we may assume the gen-
eral approach, according to which an electoral system consists in a set of rules 
formalizing the methods of the aggregation of voters’ preferences and on this basis 
allocating seats to the representative bodies. Norms building up an electoral sys-
tem define, inter alia, the right to elect and to be elected, the rules of choosing 
candidates, the running and financing of electoral campaigns, the method of con-
ducting voting, the method of converting votes into seats and the procedures al-
lowing for the control of the propriety of the election. It needs to be emphasised in 
advance that when researching electoral systems from the economic perspective 
the analyses concentrate on this part of the above-presented rules which allows for 
the determination of the election result, that is on (1) electoral formula, (2) the 
type of ballot and (3) the procedures determining the size of voting districts. 
The diversity of the applied electoral systems is immense. When classifying 
the presently used electoral systems, the thing taken into consideration most often 
is the level of projection of preferences expressed by the voters at ballot boxes, 
and in this way the rendered allocation of seats. When applying such a criterion 
one may distinguish two most general classes: the majority/plurality systems and 
                                                          
5 U. Mäki, Explanatory Ecumenism and Economics Imperialism, “Economics and Philosophy” 2002 
vol. 18, pp. 235-257; U. Mäki, Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints. “Philosophy of 
Social Sciences” 2009, vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 351-380. G.M. Hodgson, Some Remarks on ‘Economic 
Imperialism’ and International Political Economy, “Review of International Political Economy 1994, 
vol. 1, No. 1, Spring, pp. 21-8; see also E.P. Lazear, Economic Imperialism, “Quarterly Journal of 
Economics” 2000, vol. 115, No. 1, pp. 99-146. 
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the proportional representation ones (PR). In the case of the majority/plurality 
systems, elections are won by the party whose candidates win in the greatest num-
ber of constituencies, and as regards PR, the winning party is the one which 
gained the greatest support in the scale of the whole country.  
The majority/plurality systems belong to the oldest and, at the same time, 
easiest solutions still successfully used today. It is one of the most popular meth-
ods of choosing members of the modern legislature – it is used in over 80 coun-
tries and dependent territories around the world6. The nature of the plurality sys-
tems is based on the fact that the seat is allocated to the candidate that received the 
most votes. In the simplest version, when in order to get the seat the simple major-
ity of votes is enough, we deal with the first-past-the-post system (FPTP). Such 
a solution is at present used in, inter alia, Great Britain and in many countries once 
belonging to the British colonial empire7. When in order to get the seat one has to 
receive the support of the majority of voters we deal with the majority system. 
Such a solution usually leads to the necessity of organizing a second round of the 
election in which only a certain number of candidates with the greatest number of 
votes from the first round may take part. The majority system is in operation in, 
among other places: the French National Assembly, Vietnam, Iran or Belarus. 
Plurality systems are, in general, used in single-member districts, although the 
application of the plurality rule in the election in multi-member districts is also 
possible. The voter administers then as many votes as there are seats to be allocat-
ed in a given constituency. Such a modification is used rather rarely8. The single 
non-transferable vote (SNTV) system may be treated as a special case of the plu-
rality system in which the voter is in possession of only one vote but in multi-
member constituencies.  
On the other pole of the presented spectrum there are the proportional rep-
resentation systems, which are equally popular as the majority/plurality systems 
now9. The PR methods are to reflect voters’ preferences in the distribution of seats 
in parliament. An ideal situation is when the distribution of seats in the representa-
tive body ideally corresponds to the distribution of votes cast for particular parties 
taking part in the election. In practice this ideal is not possible to realize and the 
adopted solutions to a greater or lesser degree modify the result achieved directly 
on the basis of counting the votes. In the case of PR systems key importance has 
the so-called allocation formula, that is, a mathematical formula used for the con-
version of votes into seats. Among the presently used allocation formulas, the 
most often applied ones are the largest remainder methods (e.g. Hare-Niemeyer 
                                                          
6 All the data on the electoral systems are retrieved from the database the Electoral System Design 
provided online by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (accessed 15th December, 
2014). As regards bicameral parliaments the electoral system for the lower chamber is taken into 
consideration.  
7 The system based on the simple majority rule is in force e.g. in Canada, India and the United States.  
8 The system is in force in only 9 countries and dependent territories. 
9 Proportional systems are in force in election to parliaments in over 80 countries. They are used, inter 
alia, in most European countries and almost all the states in South America.  
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method) or the highest averages methods10 (e.g. the d’Hondt method or Sainte-
Laguë method), however, with the first ones the votes are converted into seats 
more accurately11. Unlike the majority/plurality systems, the proportional repre-
sentations systems are used in multi-member constituencies, though the size of the 
constituency may vary – from two-member constituencies to a situation when we 
have one constituency for the whole country12. Voting usually takes place for 
party lists. The lists as a rule are closed – the voter chooses only the list, and not 
a particular candidate13. For proportional representation systems it is typical to use 
electoral thresholds. The introduction of thresholds decreases the risk of excessive 
fragmentation of the parliament but it naturally decreases the proportionality of 
the system.  
A relatively new, 20th century solutions, are the mixed voting systems14, in 
which some of the seats are distributed according to the proportional formula and 
some of the seats are allocated according to the majority one. The implementation 
of such systems was introduced as there was a need for a solution to avoid the 
disadvantages of the purely majoritarian and purely proportional systems. The 
mixed voting systems are conducted in two basic versions: if the distribution of 
seats in both parts happens independently from each other it is referred to as the 
parallel system. However, if the final allocation of seats is decided about on the 
basis of the proportional part, that is then the mixed member proportional (MPP) 
or personalised system15. The personalized system is far more complex and less 
frequently implemented16. 
Advances in the process of democratization and the popularization of voting 
rights prompted the search for and introduction of systems that would allow for 
the fuller representation of the voters’ preferences. The most well-known solutions 
                                                          
10 The so-called quota methods may be treated as an option of this method (e.g. Hagenbach-Bischoff 
method used in Belgium) where part of the seats are allocated among these candidates who received 
a number of votes higher than the applied threshold. D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny. O 
teorii systemów wyborczych [Electoral law and party systems], Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warsaw 2004, 
pp. 106-107, 437-438. 
11 The highest averages methods lead to overrepresentation of those parties which got the most support. 
This effect is the greatest in the d’Hondt method.  
12 It happens in the case of, inter alia, Israel and Holland. 
13 It is possible to use the so-called open lists, in the case of which the voter can point out the most 
preferable candidate from the party list (such a solution is used in the elections to the Polish Sejm) or 
the free lists in the case of which the voter may pick up more than one candidate (the number of candi-
dates to choose may be equal to the numbers of seats in a given constituency) or even give more than 
one vote to the same candidate. See also A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, A. Ellis, Electoral System Design. The 
New International IDEA Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Stockholm 2008, pp. 84-85, 90. 
14 On the theoretical level these solutions were discussed already in the 19th century, however, for the 
first time the system was used in practice in Denmark after World War One. D. Nohlen, op. cit., pp. 
169-170. 
15 The solution referred to as the model is the one applied in elections to the German Bundestag. In this 
system every voter is in possession of two votes, one is for the candidate in a one-member district (the 
seats are allocated on the grounds of the plurality system) and the other for a closed party list.  
16 The system is used only in 9 countries (according to data from Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance). 
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of this type are the following: alternative voting, single-transferable vote (STV) 
and the Borda method17. 
Alternative voting 18  is a type of preferential voting organised in single-
member districts, and the voter has a chance to indicate a given number of candi-
dates that are arranged from the most to the least preferable, assigning them con-
secutive natural numbers (1 signifies the most preferable person). When reading 
the election results, first the votes for the most preferable candidates count – that 
is, the people whom voters gave the number 1. The seat is given to the candidate 
that receives an absolute majority of such a type of votes. If there is no such per-
son then the candidates with the least number of 1s are eliminated and their votes 
are distributed among the candidates that were second. This procedure lasts until 
a candidate is chosen who is supported by an absolute majority of the voters.  
A similar solution is STV although it is used in multi-member districts. With 
this system the voters can also arrange candidates crediting them with importance 
expressed in numbers. However, the basic condition in order to get a seat is to 
exceed the electoral threshold. Then if the applied criterion is not enough to dis-
tribute all the seats, a procedure is applied which takes into account other choices 
of the voters (candidates arranged second and other).   
As regards the Borda voting method, the voter arranges all the candidates 
from the most to the least preferable ones crediting them with natural numbers 
(the maximum is the number of all the candidates running for a seat in a given 
district). The numbers are then added and the seat is given to the candidate that 
received the highest score from all the added up votes. If the voters can decide 
themselves how many candidates they arrange then we deal with the system called 
approval voting19. 
It needs to be emphasised, though, that apart from the undisputed advantage 
of the preferential voting systems, which is the possibility of fuller representation 
of the voters’ preferences, they are still used relatively rarely20. The basic problem 
seems to be the fact that they are more complicated both for the voters and also 
from the perspective of deciding about the election result.   
The most important information on the subject of the presently used electoral 
systems, together with an example of the countries in which they are applied, is 
presented in table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The method had already been introduced at the end of the 18th century by French mathematician 
Jean Charles de Borda. 
18 The system is also referred to as instant run-off voting. 
19 See S.J. Brams, P.C. Fishburn, Approval Voting, “American Political Science Review” 1978, vol. 72, 
No. 3, pp. 831-847. 
20 The approval voting system has not been used in parliamentary election in any country as yet.  
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Table 1. Electoral systems’ types 
TYPE OF VOTING SYSTEM 
Examples of countries 
in which a given system 
is applied 
(the number of countries) 
MAJORITY 
/PLURALITY 
First-past-the-post 
single-member districts 
Great Britain, India, Canada 
(44) 
multi-member districts 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Tuvalu 
(9) 
Majority system 
 France, Vietnam 
(18) 
PROPORTIONAL 
lists’ type:  
closed 
Austria, Chile, Island, 
Israel, Morocco, Norway 
open 
Dania, Latvia, Poland, 
Sweden  
free 
Switzerland, Luxemburg, 
Ecuador 
voting formula: 
the highest average 
methods  
Argentina, Poland, Sweden, 
Norway,  
the largest remainder 
methods 
Algeria, Cyprus, Colombia, 
Russia 
MIXED 
parallel 
 Bulgaria, Lithuania, Mexico 
(23) 
personalised 
 Germany, Hungary, Romania 
(9) 
OTHERS 
Alternative vote 
Australia, 
(2) 
Single Transferable Vote 
Ireland, Malta 
(2) 
Single Non-Transferable Vote 
Afghanistan, Vanuatu 
(4) 
Borda method  (0) 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data obtained from the International Institute for De-
mocracy and Electoral Assistance (accessed 15th December, 2014). 
3. Corruption and barriers to entering the political market. 
Myerson’s model 
The pioneer of economic analyses of the correlations between electoral systems 
and the level of corruption is a Nobel prize-winner in economic sciences, Roger 
Myerson. In 1993 he proposed an approach which in time gained an almost canon-
like significance, both for economists and representatives of other social sciences 
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dealing with the problem in question21. Like Anthony Downs22 and the representa-
tives of the public choice approach, Myerson assumed that the actions of individu-
als on the political plane are a consequence of the same motives that govern their 
actions on the economic plane – in a particular institutional context in a rational 
way they aim for the maximization of benefits they are able to achieve with the 
use of the resources given23. Politicians running for election strive for a seat and 
voters want their candidate or party to win in order to ensure their favoured policy 
be implemented.  
Myerson also assumed that voters24:  
 recognise corruption as undesirable and attach the same importance to 
the problem;  
 have varied opinions on the remaining issues presented in political of-
fers of particular parties or candidates;  
 possess knowledge on the level of corruption of particular politicians 
and political parties25; 
 harbour a conviction that their vote counts. 
As regards political parties, however, they strive for the maximisation of the 
category known as expected corruption profit, which in fact is convergent with the 
aspiration to maximize the number of votes a party gets26. For the need of the 
model Myerson also assumed that for every party existing on the political scene 
there is a formation with the same programme for which the expected level of 
corruption equals zero (a ‘clean’ party). The subject of deliberation is then the 
situation when in the parliament there are representatives of two parties – left-
wing (L1) and right-wing (R1) – corrupt to the same level (positive and similar 
corruption level). The seats in the legislature are also run for by the representatives 
of the corresponding non-parliamentarian formations L2 and R2. Their index of 
corruption equals zero. 
Using the tools from the games theory, Myerson debates what result might be 
expected with the use of various electoral systems. He concludes that in a country 
with an electoral system based on the rule of plurality the ‘clean’ parties (L2 and 
R2) could enter parliament only when the voters decided that the problem of cor-
ruption is a more important issue for them than the ideological differences. It 
happens because with the plurality/majority voting systems the voters would be 
afraid that voting for a new formation is burdened with a risk of ‘losing’ your 
                                                          
21 R. Myerson, Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis, “Games and Economic Behavior” 1993, vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 118-132. doi: 10.1006/ 
game.1993.1006. 
22 A. Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, New York 1957, pp. 11-12, 36-38.  
23 The notion of resources here is a very wide one. Resources here are referred to as not only material 
goods but also human resources, access to information, business relations etc. 
24  R. Myerson, Effectiveness of Electoral Systems…; Idem, Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral 
Systems, “European Economic Review” 1999, vol. 43, pp. 681, 685 
25 Myerson simply assumes that ‘every party has a publicly announced corruption level’. R. Myerson, 
Theoretical Comparisons…, p. 685. 
26 The corruption profit is expressed by Myerson as a simple product of the obtained seats and a varia-
ble qualifying the level of corruption due for deputes of a given party. Ibidem. 
 POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS... 87 
voice, that is, giving it to a party that will not get a place in the parliament and will 
not have a say in governing. A similar situation will happen in a system based on 
the SNTV rule. In the case of both of the analysed solutions, in order to vote for 
L2 and R2 the voter would need to recognize them as ‘serious’ contenders, i.e. ones 
that could be a serious competition for L1 and R1. 
As regards the use of the proportional system, the chances for the ‘clean’ par-
ties to enter the parliament are, according to Myerson, much higher. Even if the 
voter expects that all the other voters with similar political preferences would vote 
for one of the corrupt formations, he or she will have an incentive to vote for L2 or 
R2. By voting in line with their actual preferences they could influence the de-
creasing of the cost of corruption without giving up the benefit of implementing 
the policy that he or she supports. It needs to be emphasized, however, that such 
a conclusion may be drawn only when we assume that the voters recognize that 
both parties (L1 and L2 as well as R1 and R2) will be ready for cooperation and the 
creation of a coalition government after the election. Moreover, it has to be point-
ed out that Myerson takes into consideration the electoral system close to the ideal 
of proportionality – without threshold, in multi-member voting districts, with the 
allocation formula allowing for a precise conversion of the votes into seats. In 
other words, he assumes that there are no barriers to entry on the political market 
or that they are very easy to get through. An assumption of this kind means that 
the example analysed by him assumes the character of an analytical construction 
as in the practice of the proportional electoral system there are always greater or 
lesser barriers to entry on the political market.  
The main conclusion from the deliberations presented by Myerson boils 
down not to favouring the proportional system over the majority system (as more 
effective in curbing corruption) but rather to acknowledging that one of the key 
elements simplifying the effective fight with corruption is lowering the barrier to 
entry on the political market. 
4. Corruption and the character of electoral lists, the level 
of threshold and the size of constituencies. Falsification 
attempts 
Myerson’s model became a point of reference for a wide range of studies on the 
relation between electoral systems and corruption. In economic literature devoted 
to the subject, two major trends can be distinguished. On the one hand the re-
searchers tried to expand the scope of the study, drawing attention to the remain-
ing elements of electoral systems and showing their potential as regards curbing 
the abuse of power. On the other hand, there have been attempts of empirical falsi-
fication of the theses formed on the theoretical grounds.  
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Both of the above presented approaches may be found in the publications by 
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini27. Unlike Myerson, these authors focused not 
so much on the very allocation formula and contrasting in this way the majority 
and proportional systems, rather they concentrated on the importance of the per-
sonalisation of choice in order to curb the abuse of power. Among the proportional 
systems they made a distinction between the systems in which voters have the 
possibility to choose a particular candidate (open or free lists) and voting for the 
closed party lists. The primary thesis reoccurring in the works by Persson and 
Tabellini comes down to the statement that the possibility to vote for one candi-
date, characteristic of the majority systems, proportional systems with open lists 
and applied to some part of the seats in the mixed voting systems is a factor in-
creasing the chances to curb corruption. In the case of voting for the closed lists, 
the decision about the choice of particular candidates does not belong to the voter, 
they do not have a possibility to reject their support for those present on the party 
list that he or she refers to as more vulnerable to power abuse. The evaluation on 
the part of the voter pertains to the whole party. It needs to be added that the sim-
plified supposition assumed by Myerson about the homogeneity of the level of 
corruption of all the members of the formation is legitimate only in this case.  
Persson and Tabellini also attempted to falsify their statement on the basis of 
empirical data. They took into account only democratic countries28, and the level 
of corruption was estimated on the basis of (1) the most popular quantitative in-
dex, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), compiled annually by Transparency 
International, (2) the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) compiled by the World 
Bank29 and (3) the estimations from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
provided by The Political Risk Services30. In line with the intention of the authors 
of the CPI, Persson and Tabellini emphasize that this Index cannot be used for 
analysis of the changes in the level of corruption over. The same is true in the case 
of the second (CCI), thus in the panel analysis the researchers use only the third, 
ICRG. Despite problems with estimations of the corruption level, they conceded 
that the analysis of the gathered material makes it possible to prove the hypothesis 
of the influence of personalized election on the curb of corruption. What is more, 
it is also the basis to the claim that the size of corruption is influenced by the elec-
toral threshold and the scale of multi-member districts. According to the authors 
the decrease in the level of corruption will benefit from lowering electoral thresh-
olds and the increase in the number of seats in the districts. The conclusion seems 
                                                          
27 T. Persson, G. Tabellini, Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge 
2000; T. Persson, G. Tabellini, Constitutions and Economic Policy, “Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives” 2004, vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 75-9; see also T. Persson, G. Tabellini, F. Trebbi, Electoral Rules and 
Corruption, “Journal of the European Economic Association” 2003, vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 958-989. 
28 The level of democratization was assessed on the basis of the estimations by the Freedom House. Its 
reports are published on the official website: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
world. 
29 The official website of the World Bank providing its estimations on the subject of governing in the 
world (including the level of corruption index) is available at: http://info.worldbank.org/gover 
nance/wgi/. 
30 Official website of the organisation: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. 
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to confirm Myerson’s theses since factors taken into consideration by Persson and 
Tabellini may well be treated as barriers to entry on the political market. From 
their research it follows at the same time that, from the point of view of the curb of 
corruption, the size of electoral district (the number of seats) is of less importance 
than personalization of the election. One may than expect that the level of corrup-
tion will be lower in countries with the majority system and one-member constitu-
encies than in countries with the proportional system and multi-member districts.  
The conclusions on the part of Persson and Tabellini were borne out by the 
research conducted by Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman 31 , which is 
worth mentioning the more, since their model has been based on the CPI/CCI. It 
should be mentioned as well that they have considered a wide range of additional 
variables characterising the socio-political background. Among them the particu-
larly significant turned out to be the one representing the type of government 
(presidential vs parliamentary systems). In contrary to the Myerson findings, their 
conclusion is that to diminish corruption the worst solution is the PR system with 
closed list accompanied with presidential system of government. 
As regards Vincenzo Verardi, who in order to estimate corruption used the 
data from International Country Risk Guide, he confirmed the thesis of the corre-
lation between the size of constituencies and the level of corruption but he under-
mined the conviction of the greater significance of a personalized election in rela-
tion to the effect of lowering barriers to entry by the use of the proportional sys-
tem. From his analyses it follows that the proportional systems are more favoura-
ble from the point of view of the fight against corruption than the majority sys-
tems32. Let us notice that this conclusion is convergent to those of Myerson.  
It also needs to be noticed that in 2006 Myerson himself ventured to evaluate 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption rules applied to one-member districts33. In his 
study he included the following systems: majority, Borda, approval and negative 
voting34. He tried to investigate which of the systems allows for the best way to 
reconcile counteracting corruption with the need for the election to be representa-
tive and he named the approval voting. Like the previous articles, his analysis is 
conducted on a purely theoretical level without the creation of econometric mod-
els and confronting the conclusions with the estimation of the level of corruption 
for particular countries. However, in the case of comparison of the above-
mentioned electoral systems the attempts to confront theoretical conclusions with 
empirical ones from the beginning would be doomed to fail as the approval and 
negative voting systems have not been used in any country as yet.  
                                                          
31 J. Kunicová, S. Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption, “British Journal of 
Political Science” 2005, vol. 35, pp. 573–606. doi:10.1017/S000712340 5000311. 
32 V. Verardi, Electoral Systems and Corruption, “Latin American Journal of Economic Development” 
2004, vol. 3, pp. 117-150. 
33 R. Myerson, Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption, “Scandinavian Journal of Econom-
ics” 2006, vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 727-742. 
34 The system of negative voting is the opposite of approval voting – the voter designates the candi-
dates that he or she rejects, ordering them from the most to the least preferable.  
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5. Conclusions 
In the economic literature devoted to the analysis of the correlation between the 
shape of electoral systems and corruption there is no denying that such a relation-
ship exists. Economists also agree that eliminating the abuse of power by people 
holding public offices benefits from lowering the barriers to entry on the political 
market and personalizing of the election. However, the consensus has still not 
been reached as regards the significance of particular rules building up an electoral 
system for the decrease of corruption, which makes it impossible to unambiguous-
ly state which electoral system would from this point of view be better.  
It has to be emphasised that a characteristic element of the analysed publica-
tions is the drive for formalising and quantifying, equipping the analysed catego-
ries with a numerical measure. The approach can be referred to as a sign of the 
times since it is appropriate for the majority of the mainstream economics. Taking 
into consideration the data which is quantitative in character makes it more diffi-
cult, or even impossible, to make use of the well-developed methods of statistical 
inference and econometric analysis. It seems that as regards the analysis of corrup-
tion, the precision attained through the construction of quantitative indexes that 
aim to characterise such a difficult and complex phenomenon may only be osten-
sible.  
What is more, it also needs to be noticed that in the analysed works there is 
a visible tendency to concentrate only on the perception of the correlation between 
the shape of the electoral system and corruption without putting this relation in 
a bigger context (except for Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman). Although theoretical 
consideration on the subject allows for such a limitation of perspective, it calls for 
complementation as regards the attempts to actually change the current electoral 
law. Starting with the fundamental issues, the question might be posed as to 
whether in countries with a high level of corruption a reform of the electoral law 
could be a solution – according to the purport of Myerson’s analyses – i.e. lower-
ing the barrier to entry on the political market. This issue seems to be more com-
plex, as such a change of electoral system could lead to fragmentation on the par-
liamentary scene, which would make the process of appointing a government 
more difficult and – in the long run – it would make governing more difficult too. 
This kind of a simple cure for corruption would, in this way, prove to be more 
dangerous than the disease itself.  
When referring to the works of economists researching the correlation be-
tween the ‘rules of the electoral game’ and the level of corruption one has to take 
into account the fact that their very improvement is only one of the elements that 
may contribute to the weakening of the incentives that induce politicians to abuse 
power.   
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